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ABSTRACT 
We conducted a field experiment in a 401(k) plan to measure the effect of 
disseminating information about peer behavior on savings. Low-saving 
employees received simplified plan enrollment or contribution increase forms. A 
randomized subset of forms stated the fraction of age-matched coworkers 
participating in the plan or age-matched participants contributing at least 6% of 
pay to the plan. We document an oppositional reaction: the presence of peer 
information decreased the savings of non-participants who were ineligible for 
401(k) automatic enrollment, and higher observed peer savings rates also 
decreased savings. Discouragement from upward social comparisons seems to 
drive this reaction. 
                                                 
*Harvard University and NBER, Yale University and NBER, Harvard University and NBER, Harvard University 
and NBER, and University of Pennsylvania. We thank Aon Hewitt and our corporate partner for conducting the field 
experiment and providing the data. We are particularly grateful to Pam Hess, Mary Ann Armatys, Diane Dove, Barb 
Hogg, Diana Jacobson, Larry King, Bill Lawless, Shane Nickerson, and Yan Xu, some of our many contacts at Aon 
Hewitt. We thank Campbell Harvey (the Editor), an Associate Editor, an anonymous referee, Hunt Allcott, Sherry 
Li, and seminar participants at Brigham Young University, Case Western Reserve University, Cornell University, 
New York University, Norwegian School of Economics, Stanford University, University of California Berkeley, 
University of Maryland, University of Pennsylvania, the NBER Summer Institute, the Harvard Business School / 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Consumer Finance Workshop, and the Behavioral Decision Research in 
Management Conference for their insightful feedback. Michael Buckley, Yeguang Chi, Christina Jenq, John 
Klopfer, Henning Krohnstad, Michael Puempel, Alexandra Steiny, and Eric Zwick provided excellent research 
assistance. Beshears acknowledges financial support from a National Science Foundation Graduate Research 
Fellowship. Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian acknowledge individual and collective financial support from the 
National Institutes of Health (grants P01-AG-005842, R01-AG-021650, and T32-AG-000186). This research was 
also supported by the U.S. Social Security Administration through grant #19-F-10002-9-01 to RAND as part of the 
SSA Financial Literacy Research Consortium. The findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the 
authors and do not represent the views of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government, or RAND. See the authors’ 
websites for lists of their outside activities. 
 
 
 1
In 1980, 30 million U.S. workers actively participated in employer-sponsored defined 
benefit (DB) retirement savings plans, and 19 million actively participated in employer-
sponsored defined contribution (DC) retirement savings plans. By 2011, participation in DB 
plans had nearly halved to 17 million workers, while DC plan participation had skyrocketed to 
74 million workers.2 The shift from DB plans, which set contribution levels and investment 
allocations on behalf of employees, to DC plans, which allow employees to choose from a 
complex array of possible contribution levels and investment allocations, has arrived amidst 
concerns that workers are not equipped to make well-informed savings choices (Mitchell and 
Lusardi, 2011). Employers have become increasingly interested in programs designed to help 
employees make good choices in DC plans. This paper studies such a program. 
We use a field experiment to investigate the effect of a peer information intervention on 
retirement savings choices. Peer information interventions involve disseminating information 
about what a target population’s peers typically do. By sharing this information, it may be 
possible to teach people that a certain behavior is more common than they had previously 
believed, motivating those people to engage in the behavior more themselves. This approach has 
been dubbed “social norms marketing” and is used at approximately half of U.S. colleges in an 
effort to reduce student alcohol consumption (Wechsler et al., 2003). 
There are several theoretical reasons why peer information interventions may succeed at 
moving behavior towards the peer-group average. An individual may mimic peers because their 
behavior reflects private information relevant to the individual’s payoffs (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993). Another possibility 
is that the intervention provides information about social norms from which deviations are costly 
due to a taste for conformity, the risk of social sanctions, identity considerations, or strategic 
complementarities (Asch, 1951; Festinger, 1954; Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994; Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003; Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland, 2010; 
Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher, 2010). Finally, individuals may directly derive utility from relative 
consumption (Abel, 1990). 
A growing empirical literature documents that peer effects indeed play a role in financial 
decisions when peers interact with each other organically. Peers affect retirement saving 
                                                 
2 Source: U.S. Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration, Private Pension Plan Bulletin 
Historical Tables and Graphs, Table E8, June 2013. 
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outcomes (Duflo and Saez, 2002 and 2003), stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 
2004; Brown et al., 2008), corporate compensation and merger practices (Bizjak, Lemmon, and 
Whitby, 2009; Shue, 2013), entrepreneurial risk-taking (Lerner and Malmendier, 2013), and 
general economic attitudes such as risk aversion (Ahern, Duchin, and Shumway, 2013).3 Peer 
information interventions such as the one we study are designed to harness the power of these 
peer effects to influence behavior. 
Many studies find that peer information interventions cause behavior to more closely 
conform to the disseminated peer norm.4 Our field experiment, however, yields a surprising 
result. Peer information interventions can generate an oppositional reaction: information about 
the high savings rates of peers can lead low-saving individuals to shift away from the peer norm 
and decrease their savings relative to a control group that did not receive peer information. Our 
evidence suggests that this effect is driven in part by peer information causing some individuals 
to become discouraged, making them less likely to increase their savings rates. 
We conducted our experiment in partnership with a large manufacturing firm and its 
retirement savings plan administrator. Employees received different letters depending on their 
401(k) enrollment status. Employees who had never participated in the firm’s 401(k) plan were 
mailed Quick Enrollment (QE) letters, which allowed them to start contributing 6% of their pay 
to the plan with a pre-selected asset allocation by returning a simple reply form. Employees who 
had previously enrolled but were contributing less than 6% of their pay received Easy Escalation 
(EE) letters, which included a nearly identical reply form that could be returned to increase their 
contribution rate to 6%. Previous work has shown that these simplified enrollment and 
                                                 
3 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) review the literature on herding and related phenomena in financial markets. For 
evidence of peer effects in other domains, see Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990), Case and Katz (1991), Besley 
and Case (1994), Hershey et al. (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), 
Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini (2000), Sacerdote (2001), Munshi (2004), 
Munshi and Myaux (2006), Sorensen (2006), Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008), Grinblatt, Keloharju, and 
Ikäheimo (2008), Kuhn et al. (2011), Narayanan and Nair (2013), and Chalmers, Johnson, and Reuter (forthcoming). 
Manski (2000) provides an overview of issues in the social interaction literature. 
4 For example, providing information about peers moves behavior towards the peer norm in domains such as entrée 
selections in a restaurant, contributions of movie ratings to an online community, small charitable donations, music 
downloads, towel re-use in hotels, taking petrified wood from a national park, and stated intentions to vote (Cai, 
Chen, and Fang, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Frey and Meier, 2004; Salganik, Dodds, and Watts, 2006; Goldstein, 
Cialdini, and Griskevicius, 2008; Cialdini et al., 2006; Gerber and Rogers, 2009). However, Beshears et al. (2013) 
find that disseminating short printed testimonials from peers is not effective at increasing conversion from brand-
name prescription drugs to lower-cost therapeutic equivalents. 
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contribution escalation mechanisms significantly increase savings plan contributions (Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian, 2009; Beshears et al., 2013). 
We assigned the QE and EE mailing recipients to one of three randomly selected 
treatments. The mailing for the first randomly selected treatment included information about the 
savings behavior of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year age bracket (e.g., employees at the 
firm between the ages of 20 and 24, employees between the ages of 25 and 29, etc.). The mailing 
for the second randomly selected treatment contained similar information about coworkers in the 
recipient’s ten-year age bracket (e.g., employees at the firm between the ages of 20 and 29). The 
mailing for the third randomly selected treatment contained no peer information and therefore 
served as a control condition. For the QE recipients, the two peer information mailings stated the 
fraction of employees in the relevant age bracket who were already enrolled in the savings plan. 
For the EE recipients, the two peer information mailings stated the fraction of savings plan 
participants in the relevant age bracket contributing at least 6% of their pay on a before-tax basis 
to the plan. 
Employees in our study naturally fall into four subpopulations distinguished along two 
dimensions: QE recipients versus EE recipients, and employees who were automatically enrolled 
at a 6% contribution rate unless they opted out (non-union workers at this firm) versus 
employees who were not enrolled unless they opted into the plan (union workers at this firm). 
Table I summarizes the key features of these four subpopulations. We distinguish along the first 
dimension because the QE and EE mailings make different requests of recipients: initial 
enrollment at a pre-selected contribution rate and asset allocation in the case of QE, and only an 
increase to the pre-selected contribution rate in the case of EE. The second dimension is 
important because it affects selection into our sample. Employees with a 6% contribution rate 
default had to actively opt out of their default to a contribution rate below 6% in order to be 
eligible for QE or EE, so no QE or EE recipient with this default was completely passive before 
the mailing. Similarly, employees with a 0% contribution rate default had to opt out of their 
default to a positive contribution rate below 6% in order to become eligible for EE.5 But in order 
to be eligible for QE, employees with a 0% contribution rate default had to be completely 
passive. This last subpopulation contains some employees who genuinely wanted to contribute 
                                                 
5 If they later returned their contribution rate to 0%, they would still be eligible for EE. 
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nothing to the 401(k) and some employees who were contributing nothing simply because of 
inertia. Prior research shows that the inertial group is likely to be large (Madrian and Shea, 2001; 
Choi et al., 2002 and 2004; Beshears et al., 2008).6 Because people who are contributing nothing 
to the 401(k) simply because of inertia are likely to have weaker convictions about their optimal 
savings rate than people who have actively chosen to contribute little, we expected QE recipients 
with a 0% contribution rate default to be the subpopulation most susceptible to the peer 
information intervention that we studied. 
In the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004), our study is a “natural field experiment,” 
since subjects never learned that they were part of an experiment. We use administrative plan 
data to track contribution rate changes during the month following our mailing. 
We measure the average effect of the presence of peer information by comparing how 
much more the peer information treatment groups increased their contribution rates than the 
control group. We also independently estimate the effect of the magnitude of the peer 
information value that employees saw. To do this, we exploit two sources of variation in the peer 
information value. First, two employees of the same age were exposed to different peer 
information values if one was randomly assigned to see information about coworkers in her five-
year age bracket and the other to see information about coworkers in her ten-year age bracket. 
Second, two employees who are similar in age but on opposite sides of a boundary separating 
adjacent five-year or adjacent ten-year age brackets would see different peer information values. 
We find that among QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default—those whom we 
expected to be most susceptible to our information treatment—receiving peer information 
significantly reduced the likelihood of subsequently enrolling in the plan from 9.9% to 6.3%, a 
decrease of approximately one-third. These recipients’ enrollment was also decreasing in the 
magnitude of the peer information value communicated. A one percentage point increase in the 
reported fraction of coworkers already enrolled in the plan significantly reduced the enrollment 
rate by 1.8 percentage points and significantly reduced the average before-tax contribution rate 
change by 0.11% of income (which is one-fifth of the average contribution rate change among 
control QE recipients with a 0% contribution default). 
                                                 
6 Prior to the mailing, the plan participation rate was 70% for employees with a non-enrollment default and 96% for 
employees with a 6% contribution rate default. The latter figure does not include employees with less than 90 days 
of tenure, since they are likely to have had automatic enrollment pending. 
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We do not find statistically significant evidence that the peer information intervention on 
average altered the savings behavior of the other three subpopulations that had previously opted 
out of their default. There is some indication (at the 10% significance level) that the magnitude 
of the peer information value reported matters for these subpopulations. Among QE recipients 
who had previously opted out of a 6% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase 
in the reported fraction of coworkers already enrolled in the plan increased the enrollment rate by 
1.1 percentage points and increased the average before-tax contribution rate change by 0.06% of 
income; both of these changes are about 1.5 times the relevant control group mean. Among EE 
recipients who had opted out of a 6% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase in 
the reported fraction of participants contributing at least 6% of their pay to the plan increased 
before-tax contribution rate changes by 0.07% of income—about one-fourth of the relevant 
control group mean. 
The finding that QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default respond negatively to 
peer information by decreasing their likelihood of enrolling in the savings plan is surprising, but 
there is some precedent for perverse unintended “boomerang effects” (Clee and Wicklund, 1980; 
Ringold, 2002) from peer information interventions. Schultz et al. (2007) find that among 
households with low initial energy consumption, a treatment group that received information 
about the energy consumption of nearby residences engaged in less energy conservation than a 
control group that did not receive such information.7 Bhargava and Manoli (2011) document that 
households eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit are less likely to take up the credit when 
they are told that overall take-up rates are high.8 
Relative to these studies, an important contribution of our experiment is that it provides 
evidence distinguishing between two possible forces behind boomerang effects: negative belief 
updates and oppositional reactions. The boomerang effects in previous field experiments could 
be driven by negative belief updates—individuals learning that the promoted behavior is less 
                                                 
7 Allcott (2011), Costa and Kahn (2013), and Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2013) also examine household responses to 
information about neighbors’ energy consumption, but they do not find boomerang effects. 
8 In related studies, Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2013) document that peer information regarding tax 
compliance can have positive or negative effects on compliance depending on the subpopulation studied. Carrell, 
Sacerdote, and West (2013) find unintended effects in another kind of peer intervention that attempted to use peer 
influence to improve the academic performance of the lowest ability students. Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2014) find 
that the anticipation of relative performance information reduces performance among low ability students in a 
community health worker training program. 
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common than they previously believed and decreasing their own engagement in the behavior as a 
result (Schultz et al., 2007). In contrast, it is unlikely that our boomerang effects are driven by 
negative belief updates. Using randomized variation in the peer participation value shown to 
individuals, we find that QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default are less likely to 
enroll in the savings plan when they see that a higher fraction of their peers are participating in 
the plan. Instead of shifting their behavior towards their updated beliefs about the peer norm, 
individuals shift their behavior away from the updated beliefs. We label such a response an 
oppositional reaction. 
We analyze treatment effect heterogeneity to better understand the drivers of oppositional 
reactions. Motivated by recent evidence that relative income comparisons within workplace peer 
groups can reduce job satisfaction for low-income workers (Card et al., 2012), we split 
employees in our experiment into two groups based on whether they are above or below the 
median income of the firm’s employees in the given employee’s U.S. state. We find that the 
oppositional reaction among QE recipients with a 0% default is concentrated among employees 
with low relative incomes. This result raises the possibility that information about peers’ savings 
choices discourages low-income employees by making their relative economic status more 
salient, reducing their motivation to increase their savings rates and generating an oppositional 
reaction. Employees with low relative income in the experiment’s other three subpopulations 
also exhibit more negative responses to peer information than employees with high relative 
income, although the statistical significance of these interactions is not as strong. In addition, we 
find evidence that some employees become discouraged when they learn that a savings rate that 
they find challenging has already been attained by many of their peers. 
Discouragement from upward social comparisons is unlikely to be the only factor that 
drives oppositional reactions, but it should be a consideration for policymakers or managers 
contemplating peer information interventions because it is potentially present in other contexts 
given the ubiquity of relative status concerns. Our field experiment highlights one channel 
through which the unintended consequences of financial decision-making interventions can 
overwhelm the intended consequences (see also Carlin, Gervais, and Manso, 2013). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides background information on the firm we 
study. Section II describes our experimental design, and Section III describes our data. Section 
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IV presents our empirical results, and Section V discusses possible mechanisms driving our 
findings. Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Company Background 
The company that ran our field experiment is a manufacturing firm with approximately 
15,000 U.S. employees. About a fifth of the employees are represented by one of five unions. In 
general, unionized workers are employed on the manufacturing shop floor, although not all shop 
floor workers are unionized. The firm offers both defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution 
(DC) retirement plans to its employees. The details of the DB plans vary according to an 
employee’s union membership, but a typical employee receives an annual credit of 4% to 6% of 
her salary in a cash balance plan, as well as interest credit on accumulated balances. Upon 
retirement, the employee receives an annuity based on the notional balance accrued in the plan. 
The details of the DC plan, which is the focus of our study, also depend on an employee’s 
union membership. In general, employees do not need to meet a minimum service requirement 
before becoming eligible for the plan. Participants can contribute up to 50% of their eligible pay 
to the plan on a before-tax basis, subject to IRS limits.9 For most employees, the firm makes a 
matching contribution proportional to the employee’s own before-tax contribution up to a 
threshold. These matching contributions vest immediately. Table II describes the matching 
formulas that apply to different employee groups. After-tax contributions to the plan are also 
allowed but not matched. All employees can allocate plan balances among 21 mutual funds, 
eleven of which are target date retirement funds. Employer stock is not an investment option. 
On January 1, 2008, all non-union employees not already contributing to the 401(k) plan 
were automatically enrolled at a before-tax contribution rate of 6% of pay unless they opted out 
or elected another contribution rate.10 The default investment for automatically enrolled 
employees was the target date retirement fund whose target retirement date was closest to the 
employee’s anticipated retirement date. Non-union employees hired after January 1, 2008 were 
also subject to automatic enrollment 60 days after hire unless they actively opted out. Automatic 
enrollment was not implemented for unionized employees until January 1, 2009—after our 
                                                 
9 In 2008, the year of the experiment, the annual contribution limit was $15,500 for workers younger than 50 and 
$20,500 for workers older than 50. 
10 Employees were informed in advance that they would be automatically enrolled unless they opted out. 
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sample period ends—because the collective bargaining negotiations necessary to effect the 
change did not take place until the fall of 2008. 
 
II. Experimental Design 
 The peer information intervention targeted non-participating and low-saving U.S. 
employees who were at least 20 years old and at most 69 years old as of July 31, 2008.11 “Non-
participants” were defined as employees who were eligible for but had never enrolled in the 
401(k) plan as of July 14, 2008. Two groups of non-participants were excluded from the 
intervention. The first group is employees who receive a special pension benefit in lieu of an 
employer match.12 The second group is employees with a 6% default contribution rate who were 
within the first 60 days of their employment at the company on July 14, 2008 and had not opted 
out of automatic enrollment; these employees were likely to be automatically enrolled soon after 
the intervention date, so the intervention would serve little purpose for them. “Low savers” were 
defined as employees who were enrolled in the 401(k) plan but whose before-tax contribution 
rate was less than both their employer match threshold and 6% as of July 14, 2008.13 The 
majority of employees in our experiment (72%) have a match threshold of 6%, but the match 
threshold varies by union status and is less than 6% for some unionized employees and greater 
than 6% for others (see Table II).14 
We used a stratified randomization scheme to allocate intervention-eligible employees to 
three equally sized treatment groups. We first sorted employees into bins based on age as of July 
31, 2008, plan participation status (enrolled or not enrolled), administrative grouping within the 
firm, and employer match structure (and therefore union status and contribution rate default). 
                                                 
11 Employees younger than 20 or older than 69 years of age were excluded from the intervention because there are 
so few employees in these categories that reporting peer information about these age groups could potentially 
divulge the savings decisions of individual employees. 
12 Only 52 employees receive this special pension benefit but otherwise met the criteria for inclusion in the 
intervention. 
13 We did not consider after-tax contribution rates when classifying low savers. Approximately 9% of plan 
participants make after-tax contributions, and approximately 9% of the employees we classified as low savers were 
making after-tax contributions at the time of the experiment. If we had limited the intervention to employees whose 
combined before-tax and after-tax contribution rates were less than both their employer match threshold and 6%, 
approximately 7% of the low savers would have been excluded. 
14 One match formula limits employer matching contributions to a maximum of $325 per year. We did not observe 
the dollar amount of matching contributions as of July 14, 2008, so the definition of low savers did not exclude 
employees who had reached the maximum. The results of our analysis do not change meaningfully if all low savers 
who faced this match formula are dropped from the sample. 
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Within each of these bins, employees were randomly assigned to receive no peer information, 
information about the savings behavior of peers in their five-year age bracket, or information 
about the savings behavior of peers in their ten-year age bracket. Note that all of the 5-year 
brackets had end points at ages 24, 29, 34, etc. In other words, all subjects between ages 20 and 
24 in the 5-year peer treatment saw the same peer information. Likewise, all of the 10-year 
brackets had end points at ages 29, 39, 49, etc. In other words, all subjects between ages 20 and 
29 in the 10-year peer treatment saw the same peer information. Psychology research indicates 
that the effect of social comparisons on behavior is most powerful when the reference group is 
similar to the target individual on one or more dimensions, such as age (Jones and Gerard, 1967; 
Suls and Wheeler, 2000). 
On July 30, 2008, Quick Enrollment and Easy Escalation mailings were sent to target 
employees, implying that employees probably received these mailings between August 1 and 
August 4, 2008. Both the QE and EE mailings gave a deadline of August 22, 2008 for returning 
the forms, but this deadline was not enforced. Appendices A, B, C, and D show sample QE and 
EE letters. 
Non-participants received a QE mailing, which described the benefits of enrollment in 
the 401(k) plan, especially highlighting the employer matching contribution.15 By checking a box 
on the form, signing it, and returning it in the provided pre-addressed postage-paid envelope, 
employees could begin contributing to the plan at a 6% before-tax rate invested in an age-linked 
target date retirement fund. Employees were reminded that they could change their contribution 
rate and asset allocation at any time by calling their benefits center or visiting their benefits 
website. The mailing sent to employees in the peer information treatments additionally displayed 
the following text: “Join the A% of B-C year old employees at [company] who are already 
enrolled in the [plan].” Letters sent to employees in the no peer information control condition 
simply omitted this sentence. The number A was calculated using data on all savings-plan-
eligible employees in the five-year or ten-year age bracket applicable to the recipient. These 
participation rates, reported in Table III, ranged from 77% to 93%. The numbers B and C are the 
boundaries of the relevant five-year or ten-year age bracket. 
                                                 
15 Information on employer contributions varied according to the match structure facing the individual employee. 
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Low savers received EE mailings, which also emphasized that employees were forgoing 
employer matching contributions.16 A low-saving employee could increase her before-tax 
contribution rate to 6%, invested according to her current asset allocation, by completing the 
form and returning it in the provided pre-addressed postage-paid envelope. Like the QE 
mailings, the EE mailings reminded recipients that they could change their contribution rate or 
asset allocation through their benefits call center or website. The EE peer information text, which 
did not appear in the mailings to employees in the no peer information control condition, read: 
“Join the D% of B-C year old [plan] participants at [company] who are already contributing at 
least 6% to the [plan].” Data on all plan participants in the relevant five-year or ten-year age 
bracket were used to calculate D, which ranged from 72% to 81% (see Table III). 
Due to technological constraints in the processing of QE and EE forms, all QE and EE 
reply forms offered only a 6% contribution rate option. Every employee with a 6% contribution 
rate default had a 6% match threshold, but the match threshold differed from 6% for 77% of 
mailing recipients with a 0% contribution rate default. The 6% contribution rate on the QE and 
EE forms could have been less appealing to employees with a different match threshold. Within 
the group of recipients with a 0% default, we have analyzed those with a match threshold other 
than 6% separately from those with a match threshold of 6%. The peer information treatment 
effect estimates are similar across these subsamples, although the standard errors of the estimates 
for the 6% threshold group are large because of the small sample size. 
 
III. Data 
Our data were provided by Aon Hewitt, the 401(k) plan administrator. The data include a 
cross-sectional snapshot of all employees in our experiment on July 14, 2008, just prior to our 
intervention. This snapshot contains individual-level data on each employee’s plan participation 
status, contribution rate, birth date, administrative grouping within the firm, employer match 
structure, union membership, and contribution rate default. A second cross-section contains the 
new plan enrollments and contribution rate changes of employees between August 4, 2008 and 
September 8, 2008—right after the mailing was sent. The final cross-section contains employees’ 
gender, hire date, and 2008 salary, which we annualize for employees who left the firm before 
                                                 
16 Again, information about employer contributions was personalized. 
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the end of 2008. In Section V, when we analyze treatment effect heterogeneity, we augment our 
data set with information on the state of residence and 2008 salary of all employees who were 
active at the firm (including those not in our experiment) as of July 14, 2008, as well as 
information on the monthly history of before-tax contribution rates for each employee. 
 
IV. Effects of Providing Peer Information 
We divide the discussion of our main empirical results into five parts. First, in Section 
IV.A, we discuss the characteristics of the employees who received mailings. Second, in Section 
IV.B, we analyze the effect of providing peer information in the QE mailing by comparing the 
savings choices of peer information QE treatment groups to those of the control group that 
received the QE mailing with no peer information. Third, in Section IV.C, we restrict our 
attention to the peer information QE treatment groups and examine the response to the 
magnitude of the peer information value in the mailing. Fourth, in Section IV.D, we examine the 
impact of the peer information given in the EE mailings. And finally, in Section V, we discuss 
possible explanations for the perverse peer information effects we observe among QE recipients 
with a 0% contribution rate default. 
 
A. Employee Characteristics 
Table IV presents summary statistics for the sample that received mailings, broken out by 
the type of mailing (QE or EE), contribution rate default (0% or 6%), and the type of peer 
information received. The majority of the sample is male, although this fraction varies 
considerably across the different subpopulations: 66% among QE recipients with a 0% default, 
76% among QE recipients with a 6% default, 55% among EE recipients with a 0% default, and 
68% among EE recipients with a 6% default. The average age is 41 years, and average tenure is 
high—9 years among QE recipients with a 0% default, 7 years among QE recipients with a 6% 
default, and 11 years in both EE subpopulations. Mean annual salary is lowest among QE 
recipients with a 0% default (about $38,000) and highest among EE recipients with a 6% default 
(about $57,000). Issues surrounding relative salaries may play a role in explaining differences in 
responses to peer information across the four groups, a topic to which we return in Section V. 
Among the two EE subpopulations, average initial before-tax contribution rates are about 2%. 
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B. Effect of Providing Peer Information in Quick Enrollment 
To estimate the effect of providing peer information in the QE mailing, we compare the 
savings choices of peer information QE treatment groups to those of the control group that 
received no peer information. The first two columns of Table V list, by contribution rate default, 
the fraction of employees in each QE treatment group who enrolled in the savings plan between 
August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008. The last two columns report the average before-tax 
contribution rate change during the same time period as a percent of income for each QE 
treatment group, again broken out by contribution rate default.17 Note that the contribution rate 
changes are almost exactly equal to 6% of the enrollment rates because the QE response cards do 
not permit contribution rates other than 6%.18 We report results both in terms of enrollment rates 
and in terms of contribution rate changes because the two measures are both useful for 
understanding economic magnitudes. In addition, we wish to be consistent with our presentation 
of the EE subpopulation results, for which the simple relationship between the two measures 
does not hold. To statistically test the effect of providing peer information, we pool the five-year 
and ten-year age bracket peer information treatments (row 4 of Table V). 
We first look at the non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default. This is the sub-
population that we expected to have the most malleable retirement savings choices. Among this 
group, 6.3% of employees who were given peer information enrolled in the plan, while 9.9% of 
those whose mailings did not include peer information enrolled in the plan, a statistically 
significant difference of 3.6 percentage points. This implies that peer information provision 
reduces savings plan enrollment by a third. The difference in enrollment rates corresponds to a 
20 basis point reduction in the average before-tax contribution rate change as a percent of 
income, a difference that is significant at the 10% level. 
In contrast, we do not find evidence that providing peer information on average affects 
non-participants who previously opted out of automatic enrollment at a 6% default contribution 
rate. There was a 2.7% enrollment rate and a 15 basis point before-tax contribution rate increase 
within the pooled peer information treatments versus a 0.7% enrollment rate and a 4 basis point 
                                                 
17 Individuals who ceased employment at the firm between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 are treated as if 
their participation status and contribution rate on their departure date continued unchanged until September 8, 2008. 
18 QE recipients could choose alternative contribution rates by using the benefits website or calling the benefits 
office, but the QE response card was probably more convenient. 
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before-tax contribution rate increase within the control group without peer information. The 
differences between these two arms are not statistically significant. 
Table VI analyzes the average effect of providing peer information in the QE mailings 
within an ordinary least squares regression framework. The sample is non-participants who 
received QE mailings. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is binary, taking a value 
of one if the employee initiated savings plan participation between August 4, 2008 and 
September 8, 2008;19 in the next two columns, the dependent variable is the change in the 
employee’s before-tax contribution rate during the same time period. The regressions control for 
gender, log tenure, log salary, and a linear spline in age with knot points every five years starting 
at age 22½.20 The regression-adjusted impact of providing peer information is qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to the effect estimated from comparing means in Table V. Including peer 
information decreases enrollment by 4.0 percentage points and reduces the change in the before-
tax contribution rate by 22 basis points for non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default, 
while it has positive but insignificant effects on non-participants with a 6% contribution rate 
default. Interestingly, for QE recipients with a 0% default, the regression coefficients on log 
tenure are strongly negative. For QE recipients with a 6% default, the regression coefficients on 
log tenure are also negative but not statistically significant. One possible interpretation for this 
result is that individuals who have been employed at the firm for a long time but have never 
enrolled in the savings plan are people who strongly believe that it is not optimal for them to 
participate in the plan. 
 
C. Effect of the Peer Information Value’s Magnitude in Quick Enrollment 
To examine how the magnitude of the peer information value received by employees 
affected responsiveness to the QE mailing, we limit our attention to the employees who were in 
the two peer information QE treatments. An important confound our analysis must address is the 
                                                 
19 We report the estimates from linear probability regressions for the binary dependent variables instead of probit or 
logit regressions because of problems with perfect predictability. Our flexible age controls sometimes perfectly 
predict failure, requiring us to drop observations from probit or logit regressions. Adjusting the sample for each 
regression specification would make it difficult to compare results across specifications, and using a common 
minimal sample for all specifications could potentially give a misleading picture of the results. Thus, we report the 
results of linear probability regressions, which allow us to maintain a consistent sample and include all observations. 
20 As noted in Table IV, salary information is missing for a small number of employees.  We exclude these 
employees from regression samples throughout the paper. We use a linear spline in age instead of age group dummy 
variables in Table VI to be consistent with Table VII. 
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“reflection problem” (Manski, 1993). Because our experiment provided employees with peer 
information related to their five-year or ten-year age brackets, the peer information value embeds 
not only information about the peer group but also information about the age-related 
characteristics of the mailing recipient. Throughout our analysis, we therefore study the 
relationship between responsiveness to the mailing and the magnitude of the peer information 
value while controlling for a flexible function of age—specifically, an age spline with knot 
points every five years starting at age 22½. 
Our empirical strategy identifies the effect of the peer information value’s magnitude 
using two sources of variation. First, two employees of the same age may see different peer 
information values if one is randomly assigned to receive information about her five-year age 
bracket and the other is randomly assigned to receive information about her ten-year age bracket. 
Second, two employees who are nearly identical in age may see different peer information values 
if their ages are on opposite sides of a boundary separating two adjacent five-year or ten-year age 
brackets. 
Table VII presents results from our baseline regression specification for analyzing the 
impact of the peer information value’s magnitude. The coefficient estimates are from ordinary 
least-squares regressions for the sample of non-participants who received QE mailings with peer 
information. The outcomes of interest are the same as in Table VI—enrollment in the savings 
plan or the change in the employee’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and 
September 8, 2008—as are the other regression controls. 
For non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase 
in the reported fraction of coworkers participating in the plan results in a statistically significant 
1.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of enrolling in the plan and a statistically 
significant 11 basis point lower change in the before-tax contribution rate. To put these estimates 
in perspective, the peer information values received by non-participants range from 77% to 93%, 
a difference of 16 percentage points (Table III). This implies an enrollment rate and before-tax 
contribution rate change that differ by 28 percentage points and 1.7% of income, respectively, 
between employees who receive the lowest and the highest peer information values—a very 
large difference relative to the 9.9% enrollment response and 0.6% before-tax contribution rate 
change of QE recipients with a 0% default who received no peer information (Table V). Note 
that these estimates cannot be directly compared to the estimates in Table VI, as the regressions 
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reported in Table VI measure the effect of the presence of peer information, while the 
regressions reported in Table VII measure the effect of the magnitude of the peer information 
value received, conditional on receiving peer information. 
In contrast, among non-participants with a 6% default, a one percentage point increase in 
the peer information value results in a 1.1 percentage point increase in the enrollment rate and a 
6 basis point higher increase in the contribution rate, although these effects are significant only at 
the 10% level. Note the complementarity of the results in Tables VI and VII. For non-
participants with a 0% default, receiving peer information reduces the response rate to the QE 
mailings on average (Table VI), and receiving a peer information value with a higher magnitude 
further reduces the QE response rate (Table VII). For QE recipients with a 6% default, receiving 
peer information leads to a small but insignificant increase in the response rate on average (Table 
VI), and the response rate also increases in the magnitude of the peer information value (Table 
VII). 
Table VIII shows the importance of the two sources of variation in the peer information 
value used to generate the results in Table VII. To facilitate comparison, the first column 
reproduces the peer information value coefficient estimates from Table VII. The coefficients in 
the second column of Table VIII are estimated by adding to the baseline regression specification 
a set of five-year age bracket dummies that correspond to the age brackets in the five-year age 
bracket peer information treatment. With the inclusion of these dummies, the effect of the peer 
information value is no longer identified using discontinuities across age bracket boundaries; 
rather, identification comes entirely from differences between employees in the five-year versus 
ten-year age bracket peer information treatments. The peer information coefficients in this 
specification are slightly larger than in the baseline specification and retain the same qualitative 
level of statistical significance. 
The regression specification presented in the last column of Table VIII excludes the five-
year age group dummies used in the second column and instead estimates different linear splines 
in age for employees in the five-year versus ten-year age bracket peer information treatments. 
Here, identification comes only from comparing employees on opposite sides of an age bracket 
boundary at which the peer information value jumps discontinuously. Under this specification, 
the peer information value coefficients do not change sign, but they are smaller in magnitude and 
lose their statistical significance. Hence, the effects estimated in the baseline specification from 
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Table VII are largely driven by the differences in peer information values between the five-year 
and ten-year age bracket peer information treatments. 
In Table IX, we investigate the robustness of our peer information value results to the 
manner in which we control for age in our regressions. The first row presents the peer 
information value coefficients from our baseline specifications in Table VII to facilitate 
comparison. In the second row, we replace the original linear spline (knot points every five 
years) with a linear spline featuring knot points every 2½ years, starting at age 22½. This spline 
is more flexible and hence gives a sense of whether the structure imposed by the original spline 
produces misleading results. The coefficients on the peer information value do not change 
meaningfully with the more flexible spline, and their statistical significance strengthens for 
employees with a 6% contribution rate default. 
One additional element that varied across the QE mailings was the fund in which 
employee contributions would be invested absent any other election by the employee. (This was 
not a factor in the EE mailings, since all employees currently contributing to the plan had a 
preexisting asset allocation.) This default fund was a target date retirement fund (e.g., Fund 
2020) chosen according to the recipient’s anticipated retirement age and thus varying 
systematically with age. Although we think it is unlikely that employees would respond to the 
mailings differentially depending on the target date retirement fund offered, we nonetheless try 
to account for this possibility by including dummy variables in the regressions for the exact 
target date retirement fund mentioned in the mailings. As shown in the third row of Table IX, 
incorporating these controls does not change our main results. 
The specifications in the last two rows of Table IX are designed to address another set of 
issues. The two sources of identifying variation in the peer information value are associated with 
an employee’s position within an age bracket. Two employees of the same age who are randomly 
assigned to the five-year versus ten-year age bracket peer information treatments differ not only 
in the peer information values they see, but also in the set of peers for whom those values are 
defined, with one group (the five-year group) more narrowly defined than the other. Similarly, 
two employees on opposite sides of a boundary separating adjacent five-year or ten-year age 
brackets are exposed to different peer information values but are also in different situations 
relative to their peer groups, with one older than most of her peer group and the other younger. 
To partially control for these factors, we add to our regressions variables capturing an 
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individual’s position relative to her peer information comparison group. The regressions reported 
in the fourth row of Table IX include linear and squared terms for the difference in years 
between the employee’s age and the mean age in her peer group; the regressions reported in the 
fifth row of Table IX include linear and squared terms for the employee’s percentile rank in age 
within her peer group. All coefficient estimates for the QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate 
default are qualitatively similar to the baseline coefficient estimates. For the QE recipients with a 
6% contribution rate default, the coefficients remain similar in magnitude but lose significance 
even at the 10% level when we control for the difference between the employee’s age and her 
peer group’s mean age. 
 
D. Effect of Providing Peer Information in Easy Escalation 
We now turn our attention to the impact of providing peer information to the low savers 
who received the EE mailings. The first two columns of Table X list the fraction of low savers, 
separately by their contribution rate default, who increased their before-tax contribution rate 
between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008. The last two columns of Table X report the 
average before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The last row in Table X 
shows that the differences between the groups who did and did not receive peer information are 
close to zero and insignificant for both 0% and 6% default contribution rate participants. 
Table XI reports the OLS-adjusted average impact of providing peer information in EE. 
In the first two columns, the dependent variable is a binary variable taking a value of one if the 
employee increased her before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 
2008; in the next two columns, the dependent variable is the change in the employee’s before-tax 
contribution rate during the same time period. In addition to the controls used in Table VI for the 
QE recipients, the regressions for the EE recipients include a full set of indicator variables for 
each employee’s before-tax contribution rate on July 14, 2008—two weeks prior to the mailing. 
The results in Table XI are qualitatively similar to the raw differences reported in Table X: 
receiving peer information has a negligible and statistically insignificant effect on savings 
responses on average. 
 Table XII presents regressions that identify the impact of the peer information value’s 
magnitude in the EE mailings. The dependent variables are the same as in Table XI. As we did in 
the corresponding analysis for QE, we restrict the regression sample to EE recipients who were 
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given peer information. We find that the peer information value’s magnitude has a positive but 
insignificant effect on the probability of increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate. The peer 
information value’s magnitude also has an insignificant effect on the before-tax contribution rate 
change for recipients with a 0% contribution rate default, but a positive and marginally 
significant effect for recipients with a 6% contribution rate default. For the latter group, a one 
percentage point increase in the peer information value results in a 7 basis point higher increase 
in the before-tax contribution rate. 
 
V. Mechanisms Driving the Effects of Peer Information 
The negative response of non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default (unionized 
employees) to the peer information in QE mailings is surprising. This contrary reaction is 
probably not due to learning that coworkers had a lower plan participation rate than expected, 
since the enrollment rate and contribution rate changes of non-participants with a 0% default 
varied inversely with the magnitude of the peer information value they received. Instead, the 
boomerang effect among QE recipients with a 0% default appears to be an oppositional reaction. 
In this section, we discuss the mechanisms that may be driving the oppositional reaction. 
The evidence suggests that peer information is discouraging and demotivating for some 
subpopulations of employees. In particular, discouragement from being compared to peers who 
have higher economic status seems to play a role, as the negative response to peer information is 
concentrated among individuals who have salaries that are low in the pay distribution of the 
firm’s employees in the individual’s state. There is also some evidence that employees can be 
discouraged when a goal that is difficult for them to attain is revealed to be a goal that many 
peers have achieved. EE recipients with a 0% default reacted more negatively to peer 
information if they initially had a low contribution rate rather than a high contribution rate, 
making the goal of increasing to a 6% contribution rate harder to reach. 
Our experiment was not specifically designed to test these explanations for the effect of 
peer information, so our analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity must be interpreted with 
caution. Nonetheless, issues of low relative status and difficult-to-achieve goals arise naturally in 
many settings, so this pattern of responsiveness is potentially relevant for other contexts in which 
peer information interventions might be deployed. 
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A. Relative Salary and Discouragement from Peer Information 
Recent research by Card et al. (2012) indicates that job satisfaction is affected by an 
employee’s rank within the salary distribution of that employee’s peers. Card et al. randomly 
assigned employees of the University of California to receive or not to receive information about 
a website that disclosed the pay of all University of California employees. Among employees 
below the median pay for their occupation category (i.e., faculty versus staff) within their 
department, the information treatment had a negative effect on job satisfaction, while there was 
no significant effect for employees above the median pay for their occupation category within 
their department. Relative pay concerns are quite local. For staff (who constitute over 80% of the 
sample), being below the campus-wide median staff pay had smaller negative effects than being 
below their department’s median staff pay. 
Drawing on these findings, we test how the peer information effect in our experiment 
varies with an employee’s salary rank among local coworkers.21 Employees are likely to have 
some knowledge, through both formal and informal workplace communication channels, of their 
positions in the local pay distribution at the firm. Having one’s savings choices compared to 
coworkers’ savings choices in our experiment may serve as a reminder of relative economic 
standing, creating feelings of discouragement and thereby triggering an oppositional reaction 
among employees with low relative income. Larger peer savings numbers would exacerbate 
discouragement by increasing the size of the perceived economic gap between the low-income 
employee and his coworkers.22  
Our data are not as detailed as the University of California data, so we calculate an 
employee’s rank within the salary distribution for all employees at the firm in the same state.23 
This peer group includes employees who were not part of our experiment but excludes 
employees who were not active at the firm as of July 14, 2008. Two states account for half of the 
                                                 
21 We thank an Associate Editor for suggesting this analysis. 
22 One might wonder why a higher peer information number wouldn’t also create more discouragement among high-
income employees. See Price et al. (1994) and Sloman, Gilbert, and Hasey (2003) for a discussion of why negative 
information is more likely to discourage people who are already low-status to begin with. 
23 We do have some limited information about administrative groupings at the firm, but these groupings do not 
appear to correspond to meaningful peer groups. Nonetheless, we have calculated salary rank within administrative 
grouping and experimented with using it for analyzing heterogeneous treatment effects. In general, the results are 
directionally similar but attenuated relative to the results using salary rank among employees at the firm within the 
same state. 
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employees in the experiment, but 23 other states account for the remaining employees.24 Internet 
Appendix Table I reports the distribution of employees in our experiment across within-state 
income quartiles. Employees in our experiment disproportionately fall in the lower quartiles of 
the distribution, especially in the case of employees with a 0% default. 
We begin by studying the reaction to peer information among QE recipients with a 0% 
default. To estimate heterogeneity in the effect of the presence of peer information, we augment 
the regression specifications from Table VI with two additional explanatory variables: an 
indicator for being below the median income among active employees at the firm in the same 
state and the interaction between that indicator and the indicator for receiving peer information. 
The first two columns of Table XIII display the results.  
The coefficients on the uninteracted dummy for receiving peer information show that QE 
recipients with a 0% default and high relative income have a small positive but insignificant 
response to the presence of peer information. The coefficient on the interaction term, however, is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in both columns. Peer information causes 
QE recipients with a 0% default and low relative income to decrease their enrollment rate by 5.2 
percentage points more and decrease their before-tax contribution rate by 29 basis points of pay 
more than QE recipients with a 0% default and high relative income. 
Turning to heterogeneity in the effect of the peer information value’s magnitude in Quick 
Enrollment, we expand the set of explanatory variables in the Table VII regression specifications 
to include the indicator for having an income below the median among active employees at the 
firm in the same state, the interaction between the below-median income indicator and the peer 
information value received (the participation rate among employees in the relevant age group), 
and the interaction between the below-median income indicator and all elements of the age 
spline. It is necessary to allow separate age splines for the high and low relative income 
employees so that the effect of the peer information value is identified only using variation 
generated by discontinuities around age group boundaries and differences between the five-year 
and ten-year age group peer information values. 
The last two columns of Table XIII show that for QE recipients with a 0% default and 
high relative income, a one percentage point increase in the peer information value increases the 
                                                 
24 We do not know the state of three employees in our experiment, so we assign them to the most common state. 
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likelihood of enrolling in the savings plan by 1.0 percentage point and increases the before-tax 
contribution rate change by 6 basis points of pay, although neither effect is statistically 
significant. For low relative income employees, however, the effect of a one percentage point 
increase in the peer information value is 2.8 percentage points more negative for the likelihood 
of enrolling and 17 basis points more negative for the before-tax contribution rate change. Both 
of these interactions are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
In sum, the oppositional reaction we identified among QE recipients with a 0% default is 
present only among employees with low income relative to other employees at the firm in the 
same state. This pattern suggests that discouragement from upward social comparisons may play 
a role in generating the oppositional reaction to peer information in our experiment. Further 
evidence in favor of this hypothesis is found in Table XIV, which shows that the treatment 
interactions with being in the bottom half of the firm-wide salary distribution are insignificant, 
with point estimates that are smaller in magnitude or of the opposite sign compared to the 
treatment interactions with being in the bottom half of the firm’s state-specific salary 
distribution. Recall that Card et al. (2012) find that employees are most concerned about their 
salary rank relative to local coworkers, so vulnerability to discouragement from peer 
comparisons should depend more on where the employee stands in the local firm wage 
distribution than in the firm-wide wage distribution. Furthermore, employees are more likely to 
be unaware of their location in the firm-wide wage distribution than in the local wage 
distribution. We have also explored treatment interactions with being in the bottom half of the 
overall state-wide pay distribution (which includes individuals who do not work for the firm) and 
treatment interactions with having a salary below $30,000. As shown in Internet Appendix 
Tables II and III, none of these interactions is significant.  
Internet Appendix Tables IV through VII show analogous regressions for the other three 
subpopulations, QE recipients with a 6% default and EE recipients with a 0% or a 6% default. 
We generally find the same patterns of a negative peer information treatment interaction with 
having below-median income among other employees at the firm in one’s state and a weaker 
treatment interaction with having below-median income in the firm-wide distribution. The 
interactions with having below-median income among other employees at the firm in one’s state 
are not always statistically significant, but for each of the three subpopulations, there is at least 
one negative interaction with either the presence of peer information or the peer information 
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value that is significant at the 10% level or better, and no significant positive interactions. One 
interesting pattern is that in these three subpopulations, unlike among QE recipients with a 0% 
default, being below the median local income does not tend to cause employees to move away 
from the peer norm. Rather it merely attenuates the positive reaction to peer information found 
among above-median-income employees. A possible interpretation of this difference is that the 
type of employee who takes an active role in his or her savings (and thus ends up in these three 
subpopulations) is less prone to discouragement from upward comparisons. 
 
B. Difficult Goals and Discouragement from Peer Information 
While discouragement caused by upward socioeconomic comparisons seems to 
contribute to negative reactions to peer information, discouragement driven by other related 
mechanisms may simultaneously be at work. In particular, the psychology literature documents 
that setting goals for individuals can motivate increased effort and achievement in tasks ranging 
from problem solving to wood chopping, especially when the goals are challenging (Locke et al., 
1981; Mento, Steel, and Karren, 1987; Gollwitzer, 1999; Heath, Larrick, and Wu, 1999; Locke 
and Latham, 2002). But learning that a goal one finds extremely difficult has already been 
achieved by many of one’s peers may damage one’s self-esteem, making the goal feel more 
unattainable. When goals are too difficult, people are more likely to reject them and to perform 
poorly (Motowidlo, Loehr, and Dunnette, 1978; Mowen, Middlemist, and Luther, 1981; Erez and 
Zidon, 1984; Lee, Locke, and Phan, 1997). 
We have no observable variation in how challenging QE recipients might have viewed 
the suggested 6% contribution rate to be, since all QE recipients had an initial contribution rate 
of 0%. But EE recipients had starting contribution rates that varied from 0% to 5%. We 
conjecture that EE recipients who initially had a lower contribution rate are more likely than EE 
recipients who initially had a higher contribution rate to view the suggested 6% contribution rate 
as a challenging goal.25 Internet Appendix Table VIII shows the contribution rate distribution of 
EE recipients with a 0% default and a 6% default immediately before the experiment was 
launched. The distributions are not perfectly uniform, but there is a meaningful number of 
                                                 
25 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis. 
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employees in each sample at each contribution rate from 0% to 5%.26 We augment the regression 
specifications in Table XI by including the interaction between the indicator for receiving peer 
information and an indicator for having an initial contribution rate of 0%, 1%, or 2%. Indicators 
for each of the six possible initial contribution rates are already included as explanatory 
variables, omitting one to avoid collinearity with the constant. 
In Table XV, columns 1 and 3 report the results for EE recipients with a 0% default, who 
are the EE group most similar to the QE recipients with a 0% default. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that the oppositional reaction among QE recipients with a 0% default is driven in part 
by peer information interacting negatively with a difficult suggested goal, the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction between the dummy for receiving peer information and the 
dummy for having a low initial contribution rate are negative and statistically significant at the 
10% level. Employees with high initial contribution rates respond to the presence of peer 
information with a 3.8 percentage point increase in their likelihood of increasing their 
contribution rates and an 18 basis points of pay increase in their before-tax contribution rate 
change. The former estimate is not statistically significant, and the latter estimate is significant at 
the 10% level. Employees with low initial contribution rates have a response to peer information 
that is 8.7 percentage points more negative for the likelihood of a contribution rate increase and 
38 basis points of pay more negative for the before-tax contribution rate change. 
However, not all employees are demotivated when they learn that many of their peers 
have achieved a difficult goal. Columns 2 and 4 of Table XV show that EE recipients with a 6% 
default who have low initial contribution rates have a somewhat more positive response to peer 
information than EE recipients with the same default and high initial contribution rates. The 
effect on the binary indicator of whether the recipient increased his before-tax contribution rate is 
not significant, but the effect on the average before-tax contribution rate change is significant at 
the 10% level. For some subpopulations, learning that many peers achieved a challenging goal is 
perhaps an encouraging signal of one’s own ability to achieve this goal. 
In Internet Appendix Table IX, we examine the robustness of the findings in Table XV 
by estimating separate treatment effects from the presence of peer information for each of the six 
                                                 
26 An employee with a 0% contribution rate is not considered a non-participant and therefore receives an Easy 
Escalation mailing instead of a Quick Enrollment mailing if that employee previously had a contribution rate higher 
than 0%. 
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possible initial contribution rates. The results broadly corroborate the patterns we observe when 
grouping the 0%, 1%, and 2% contribution rates together and the 3%, 4%, and 5% contribution 
rates together. We have also investigated how EE recipients with low initial contribution rates 
differ from EE recipients with high initial contribution rates in their responses to the magnitude 
of the peer information value. Internet Appendix Table X shows the results from regressions that 
expand the Table XII specifications by including the interaction between the dummy for having a 
low initial contribution rate and the peer information value as well as the interaction between the 
dummy for having a low initial contribution rate and all elements of the age spline. The results 
are consistent with the results for the effect of the presence of peer information. Among EE 
recipients with a 0% default, employees with a low initial contribution rate are more negatively 
responsive to the peer information value than employees with a high initial contribution rate, and 
among EE recipients with a 6% default, employees with a low initial contribution rate are 
slightly more positively responsive to the peer information value than employees with a high 
initial contribution rate. However, none of these interaction coefficients is statistically 
significant. 
Overall, there is some evidence that for employees with a 0% default, the oppositional 
reactions we observe were caused in part by discouragement from learning that so many peers 
had achieved such a challenging goal. However, not all subpopulations are discouraged by the 
combination of more challenging goals and peer information. 
 
C. Other Factors that Might Affect the Response to Peer Information 
In this subsection, we consider other factors that may determine how individuals respond 
to peer information. We have previously argued that employees who have never made an active 
decision in the retirement savings plan (i.e., QE recipients with a 0% default contribution rate) 
may respond more to peer information because they have weaker convictions about what their 
savings rate should be. We now explore an extension of this argument: did EE recipients who 
had not recently made an active decision regarding their contribution rate as of the beginning of 
the experiment respond more to peer information? Such an association could exist if, for 
example, the type of person who is prone to be passive is also prone to have weak convictions 
about her optimal savings choice even after an active savings decision has been made at least 
once. 
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For each EE recipient, we use data on monthly contribution rate histories to calculate the 
amount of time since the employee had last changed his or her before-tax contribution rate. For 
some employees, the last change took place when they initially enrolled in the plan. We then 
split employees into groups depending on whether the amount of time since their last change was 
above or below the median for their sample (the 0% default sample or the 6% default sample, as 
appropriate). In Internet Appendix Table XI, we add two explanatory variables to the Table XI 
regression specifications, which study the effect of the presence of peer information for EE 
recipients: an indicator for having an above-median time since the last contribution rate change 
and the interaction between that indicator and the indicator for receiving peer information. The 
estimated coefficients on these additional variables are small and never have a t-statistic greater 
than one in absolute value. It may be the case that once an employee has thought about his 
401(k) enough to make an active savings decision, the strength of his conviction about optimal 
savings behavior in the plan does not covary with how long he remains at that contribution rate.27 
Another factor that may have generated the oppositional response to peer information 
among QE recipients with a 0% default is the perception that one’s optimal savings behavior is 
negatively correlated with that of the coworkers used to construct the peer information value. QE 
recipients with a 0% default were unionized employees, and because unionized employees 
constituted only one-fifth of the firm’s workforce, company-wide 401(k) participation rates 
largely reflected the choices of non-union workers. If unionized employees identify themselves 
in opposition to non-union employees, they may prefer savings choices that are atypical by 
company standards. We have tried to examine this hypothesis empirically by testing whether the 
magnitudes of the peer information effects vary with the fraction of the peer reference group that 
is unionized. The results do not support the hypothesis. 
Also, QE recipients with a 0% default may have believed, due to an antagonistic 
collective bargaining relationship with the firm, that savings messages sent by the company to 
unionized employees like them were likely to be counter to their own best interests. A related 
                                                 
27 We do not examine heterogeneity in treatment effects for QE recipients with a 6% default according to the amount 
of time since the last active decision because almost all employees in this sample last made an active decision when 
they opted out of automatic enrollment at the beginning of 2008. Only a handful of employees in this group were 
hired later in 2008 and opted out of automatic enrollment then. 
 
 
 26
interpretation, in line with psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), is that mistrust caused 
QE recipients with a 0% default to perceive the peer information as coercive, leading them to act 
contrary to the peer information in an effort to assert their independent agency. The weakness of 
this set of hypotheses is that it is not clear why the inclusion of peer information would produce 
greater mistrust than the control letter, which also strongly encouraged 401(k) participation, nor 
why mistrust would be increasing in the magnitude of the peer information value. Furthermore, 
while there have been occasional strikes at the firm, labor relations are not particularly strained, 
either in general or at the time of the experiment. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Our field experiment shows that exposure to information about the actions of peers can 
generate an oppositional reaction. Among the subpopulation we expected to be most susceptible 
to peer influence—employees not enrolled in the 401(k) plan who had a non-enrollment default 
(in this case, unionized employees)—we found a negative, oppositional reaction to both the 
presence of peer information and the magnitude of its value. On the other hand, employees who 
had actively chosen a low 401(k) contribution rate exhibited some positive reaction to the 
magnitude of the peer information value. 
An analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity indicates that the oppositional reaction to 
peer information exhibited by Quick Enrollment recipients with a non-enrollment default was 
concentrated among employees with low incomes relative to their local coworkers. Thus, peer 
information may have made these employees less likely to increase their savings because they 
were discouraged by the reminder of their low economic status. We also find negative treatment 
interactions with low relative income in the other subpopulations in our experiment. 
In settings where many individuals may not know which choices are appropriate for their 
circumstances, such as defined contribution savings plans, peer information interventions have a 
number of appealing features. If the choices of the average person are reasonable, individuals 
whose choices are in the extremes of the distribution can adjust upon learning about the typical 
behavior of peers. At the same time, peer information interventions are not coercive—individuals 
who are confident that it is appropriate for them to deviate from the peer norm are not forced to 
change their decisions. Our results, however, reveal an important drawback of highlighting the 
behavior of peers. Peer information inevitably contains an element of social comparison, and 
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individuals with low status may react negatively to the information. A key issue for future 
research is to develop a better understanding of how peer information interventions can be 
shaped to minimize such oppositional reactions, perhaps by carefully selecting the reference 
group to minimize discouraging social comparisons. 
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Table I: Features of the Four Subpopulations in the Experiment 
This table summarizes the key features of the four subpopulations that were targeted in the field 
experiment. 
  
 Quick Enrollment recipients Easy Escalation recipients  
 0% contribution 
rate default 
6% contribution 
rate default 
0% contribution 
rate default 
6% contribution 
rate default 
Union 
membership 
Yes No Yes No 
Savings plan 
enrollment 
mechanism 
Opt-in Opt-out 
(automatic 
enrollment) 
Opt-in Opt-out 
(automatic 
enrollment) 
Savings plan 
participation 
status prior to 
experiment 
Non-participant Non-participant Participant Participant 
Savings plan 
contribution rate 
prior to 
experiment 
0% 0% Less than 6% 
and less than 
their 401(k) 
match threshold 
Less than 6% 
(which is their 
401(k) match 
threshold) 
Savings plan 
decision prior to 
experiment 
Passively 
accepted default 
Actively opted 
out of plan 
Actively chose 
contribution rate 
Actively chose 
contribution rate 
 
 
 
Table II: Employer Match Formulas 
This table describes the employer match formulas that applied to different groups of employees 
at the firm. 
 
  
 
 
Match formula for before-tax contributions 
Number of employees included in 
the mailing with this match 
Union Non-union 
Match A 100% on the first 1% of pay contributed 
50% on the next 5% of pay contributed 
0 3,158 
Match B The minimum of $325 or 50% on the first 
2% of pay contributed 
126 0 
Match C 100% on the first 2% of pay contributed 
50% on the next 2% of pay contributed 
25% on the next 4% of pay contributed 
1,114 0 
Match D 100% on the first 2% of pay contributed 
50% on the next 2% of pay contributed 
25% on the next 2% of pay contributed 
261 0 
Match E 50% on the first 4% of pay contributed 135 0 
Match F 50% on the first 6% of pay contributed 149 0 
Match G† None 0 0 
† This group was not included in the intervention. 
 
 
 
Table III: Peer Information Values 
This table lists the peer information values in the mailings sent to employees in the peer 
information treatments. Employees not participating in the savings plan were sent the 
participation rate of employees in either their 5-year or 10-year age bracket (first column). 
Participating employees with before-tax contribution rates below both their match threshold and 
6% were sent the fraction of participants in either their 5-year or 10-year age bracket whose 
before-tax contribution rate was at least 6% (third column). 
 
 
Savings plan 
participation 
rate 
# of employees  
sent  
participation 
rate 
Fraction of 
participants 
contributing 
≥ 6% of pay 
# of 
employees 
sent ≥ 6% 
contributor 
fraction 
5-year age brackets     
20 – 24 77% 61 79% 57 
25 – 29 87% 72 74% 155 
30 – 34 90% 45 72% 161 
35 – 39 90% 61 72% 162 
40 – 44 92% 55 73% 166 
45 – 49 93% 41 75% 172 
50 – 54 91% 56 77% 142 
55 – 59 90% 44 78% 102 
60 – 64 88% 35 79% 47 
65 – 69 87% 7 81% 7 
10-year age brackets     
20 – 29 83% 135 76% 202 
30 – 39 90% 104 72% 331 
40 – 49 92% 97 74% 339 
50 – 59 91% 109 78% 240 
60 – 69 88% 38 79% 55 
 
 
 
Table IV: Sample Characteristics 
This table summarizes the characteristics of Quick Enrollment recipients (Panel A) and Easy Escalation recipients (Panel B). 
Employees are grouped by their contribution rate default and the type of peer information they received in their mailing. Salary data 
are missing for some employees in the sample. These employees are excluded from the regression analyses in subsequent tables. 
 
Panel A: Quick Enrollment recipients 
(non-participants in the savings plan) 
  0% contribution rate default 6% contribution rate default 
 
No peer 
information 
5-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
10-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
No peer 
information 
5-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
10-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
Percent male 69.1 66.0 61.6 77.2 75.4 75.4 
Age       
   Mean 41.0 40.7 41.0 40.4 41.2 41.3 
   (Std. dev.) (13.4) (13.4) (13.4) (11.4) (11.6) (12.2) 
Tenure (years)       
   Mean 9.4 9.5 9.0 7.2 7.5 7.8 
   (Std. dev.) (12.0) (12.1) (12.1) (9.3) (9.5) (8.4) 
Annual salary ($1000s)       
   Mean 38.3 38.1 39.0 46.3 46.2 45.1 
   (Std. dev.) (16.7) (15.1) (18.9) (22.3) (23.9) (21.5) 
Sample size N = 343 N = 347 N = 349 N = 136 N = 130 N = 134 
# missing salary data 6 2 7 1 0 0 
  
 
 
Panel B: Easy Escalation recipients 
(plan participants with initial before-tax contribution rate < min{match threshold, 6%}) 
 0% contribution rate default 6% contribution rate default 
 
No peer 
information 
5-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
10-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
No peer 
information 
5-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
10-yr. age 
bracket peer 
information 
Percent male 61.3 51.8 52.0 67.7 67.6 69.5 
Age       
   Mean 39.9 40.8 41.1 41.8 42.0 42.0 
   (Std. dev.) (11.7) (11.8) (11.9) (10.6) (10.7) (10.5) 
Tenure (years)       
   Mean 11.4 10.6 10.5 10.7 10.5 11.1 
   (Std. dev.) (10.1) (9.8) (10.6) (10.2) (9.6) (9.9) 
Annual salary ($1000s)       
   Mean 43.8 42.0 41.1 57.4 56.1 58.3 
   (Std. dev.) (16.2) (13.3) (14.2) (30.3) (24.8) (28.3) 
Before-tax contrib. rate       
   Mean 2.5 2.5 2.6 1.9 1.8 1.8 
   (Std. dev.) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) (1.7) (1.8) (1.8) 
Sample size N = 235 N = 255 N = 256 N = 931 N = 916 N = 911 
# missing salary data 0 0 0 0 2 3 
 
 
 
 
Table V: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment: Mean Comparisons 
This table shows the average responses of employees who received Quick Enrollment mailings, 
reported separately by contribution rate default and treatment condition, and the differences in 
these average responses across treatment conditions. The responses of interest are enrollment in 
the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 and the before-tax contribution 
rate change as a percent of income during the same time period. Quick Enrollment recipients in 
the peer information treatments were shown the plan participation rate of employees in their five-
year or ten-year age bracket. The first two columns display standard errors from tests of 
proportions in parentheses, with the standard errors in the last row calculated under the null 
hypothesis that the two proportions are equal. The last two columns display standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, **, and *** in the last row indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 Fraction who enrolled in 
savings plan  
Average before-tax 
contribution rate change  
 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
(1) No peer info 9.9% 
(1.6) 
0.7% 
(0.7) 
0.58% 
(0.10) 
0.04% 
(0.04) 
(2) 5-year age bracket info 6.6% 
(1.3) 
2.3% 
(1.3) 
0.40% 
(0.08) 
0.14% 
(0.08) 
(3) 10-year age bracket info 6.0% 
(1.3) 
3.0% 
(1.5) 
0.36% 
(0.08) 
0.16% 
(0.08) 
(4) Combined 5-year and 10-year 6.3% 
(0.9) 
2.7% 
(1.0) 
0.38% 
(0.06) 
0.15% 
(0.06) 
Difference: (4) – (1) -3.6%** 
(1.7) 
1.9% 
(1.5) 
-0.20%* 
(0.11) 
0.10% 
(0.07) 
 
 
  
Table VI: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment: Regression Analysis 
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable 
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is 
Quick Enrollment recipients who have a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% 
contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at 
22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Enrolled in savings plan 
Dependent variable: 
Before-tax contribution rate change 
 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
Received peer info -0.040** 0.019 -0.221** 0.099 
dummy (0.019) (0.014) (0.112) (0.078) 
Male dummy -0.013 -0.031 -0.044 -0.154 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.116) (0.113) 
log(Tenure) -0.025*** -0.010 -0.146*** -0.054 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.047) (0.035) 
log(Salary) 0.007 0.038* 0.021 0.252* 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.129) (0.136) 
Age spline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.033 0.048 0.029 0.052 
Sample size N = 1,024 N = 399 N = 1,024 N = 399 
 
 
  
Table VII: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Quick Enrollment 
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable 
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is 
Quick Enrollment recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% 
contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4) who were given peer information. The peer 
information value was the plan participation rate of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year or ten-
year age bracket. The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 
67.5. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Enrolled in savings plan 
Dependent variable: 
Before-tax contribution rate change 
 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
Peer info value -1.760** 1.083* -10.663** 5.558* 
 (0.731) (0.559) (4.613) (2.935) 
Male dummy 0.011 -0.057* 0.088 -0.293* 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.134) (0.166) 
log(Tenure) -0.010 -0.016** -0.061 -0.087** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.053) (0.044) 
log(Salary) -0.022 0.062* -0.138 0.398** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.170) (0.199) 
Age spline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.034 0.085 0.033 0.091 
Sample size N = 687 N = 264 N = 687 N = 264 
 
 
  
Table VIII: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Quick Enrollment: 
Sources of Identification 
This table reports the peer information value coefficients from ordinary least-squares regressions 
analyzing employee responses to Quick Enrollment mailings. The coefficients in each cell come 
from separate regressions. The sample is recipients of Quick Enrollment mailings that included a 
peer information value equal to the savings plan participation rate of coworkers in either the 
recipient’s five-year or ten-year age bracket. Depending on the row, the sample is further 
restricted to employees with a 0% contribution rate default or a 6% contribution rate default. The 
dependent variable is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 
and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. 
The column headings indicate the source of variation used to identify the peer information value 
coefficient. All regressions include controls for gender, log tenure, log salary, and a constant, as 
in Table VII, as well as a linear spline in recipient age with knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, 
and 67.5. Additional controls for age are included as indicated in the bottom rows. Standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Source of identification for the effect  
of the peer information value 
 
Baseline 
(from Table 
VII) 
Differences in 5-year 
vs. 10-year peer 
information values 
Discontinuities 
around age 
bracket boundaries
Dependent variable:  
Enrolled in savings plan 
   
 0% contribution rate default (N = 687) -1.760** -1.970** -0.736 
(0.731) (0.816) (1.224) 
 6% contribution rate default (N = 264) 1.083* 1.490* 0.994 
(0.559) (0.881) (1.025) 
Dependent variable:  
Before-tax contribution rate change 
   
  0% contribution rate default (N = 687) -10.663** -11.784** -5.237 
(4.613) (5.073) (7.611) 
  6% contribution rate default (N = 264) 5.558* 9.038* 3.180 
(2.935) (5.261) (3.860) 
Age controls    
  Age spline Yes Yes Yes 
  5-yr. age group dummies No Yes No 
  Rec’d 10-year age group info dummy No No Yes 
  Age spline × rec’d 10-year age group info No No Yes 
 
 
  
Table IX: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Quick Enrollment: 
Robustness to Different Age Controls 
This table reports the peer information value coefficients from ordinary least-squares regressions 
analyzing employee responses to Quick Enrollment mailings. The estimated coefficients in each 
cell come from separate regressions. The sample is recipients of Quick Enrollment mailings that 
included a peer information value equal to the savings plan participation rate of coworkers in 
either the recipient’s five-year or ten-year age bracket. The sample is further restricted to those 
with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 
2 and 4). The dependent variable is either a dummy for enrolling in the plan between August 4, 
2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time 
period. All regressions include controls for gender, log tenure, log salary, and a constant, as in 
Table VII. The regressions vary in how they control for recipient age: (1) a linear spline in age 
with knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5 (every five years), which is the baseline; (2) a 
linear spline in age with knot points at 22.5, 25, 27.5, …, and 67.5 (every 2.5 years); (3) a linear 
spline in age with knot points every 5 years and dummies for the target date retirement fund 
offered, which is dependent on age; (4) a linear spline in age with knot points every five years 
and controls for the number of years the recipient is from the age group mean (linear and squared 
terms); or (5) a linear spline in age with knot points every five years and controls for the 
recipient’s percentile rank in the age group (linear and squared terms). Standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Enrolled in savings plan 
Dependent variable: 
Before-tax contribution  
rate change 
Parameterization of age controls 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
Age spline with knot points every 5 -1.760** 1.083* -10.663** 5.558* 
years (Baseline from Table VII) (0.731) (0.559) (4.613) (2.935) 
Age spline with knot points every  -1.736** 1.342** -10.520** 6.760** 
2.5 years (0.734) (0.662) (4.636) (3.285) 
Dummies for target date retirement  -1.931*** 0.990* -11.665** 5.797* 
fund offered (0.723) (0.574) (4.558) (3.396) 
Controls for years from age group  -2.041** 0.890 -12.220** 5.111 
mean (linear and squared) (0.797) (0.596) (4.994) (3.517) 
Controls for percentile within age  -1.757** 1.180* -10.438** 6.519* 
group (linear and squared) (0.748) (0.657) (4.673) (3.798) 
Sample size N = 687 N = 264 N = 687 N = 264 
 
 
  
Table X: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Easy Escalation: Mean Comparisons 
This table shows the average responses of employees who received Easy Escalation mailings, 
reported separately by contribution rate default and treatment condition, and the differences in 
these average responses across treatment conditions. The responses of interest are increasing 
one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 and the 
before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. Easy Escalation recipients in 
the peer information treatments were shown the fraction of plan participants in their five-year or 
ten-year age bracket with before-tax contribution rates of at least 6%. The first two columns 
display standard errors from tests of proportions in parentheses, with the standard errors in the 
last row calculated under the null hypothesis that the two proportions are equal. The last two 
columns display standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, **, and *** in the 
last row indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Fraction who increased 
before-tax contribution rate 
Average before-tax 
contribution rate change  
 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
(1) No peer info 10.6% 
(2.0) 
8.2% 
(0.9) 
0.33% 
(0.08) 
0.26% 
(0.04) 
(2) 5-year age bracket info 9.8% 
(1.9) 
7.8% 
(0.9) 
0.30% 
(0.07) 
0.29% 
(0.05) 
(3) 10-year age bracket info 11.3% 
(2.0) 
8.8% 
(0.9) 
0.38% 
(0.09) 
0.40% 
(0.07) 
(4) Combined 5-year and 10-year 10.6% 
(1.4) 
8.3% 
(0.6) 
0.34% 
(0.06) 
0.35% 
(0.05) 
Difference: (4) – (1) -0.1% 
(2.4) 
0.1% 
(1.1) 
0.01% 
(0.10) 
0.08% 
(0.06) 
 
 
  
Table XI: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Easy Escalation: Regression Analysis 
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable 
is either a dummy for increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and 
September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The 
sample is Easy Escalation recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 
6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The linear spline in age has knot points at 22.5, 
27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14, 2008 are controlled for using 
a full set of contribution rate dummies. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust 
to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Increased before-tax contribution rate 
Dependent variable: 
Before-tax contribution rate change 
 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
Received peer -0.004 0.001 -0.008 0.072 
info dummy (0.025) (0.011) (0.101) (0.057) 
Male dummy -0.052** 0.002 -0.147 0.024 
 (0.026) (0.011) (0.105) (0.047) 
log(Tenure) -0.003 0.002 -0.047 0.030 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.056) (0.023) 
log(Salary) 0.064* 0.056*** 0.308** 0.406*** 
 (0.038) (0.014) (0.147) (0.115) 
Age spline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contribution rate 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.029 0.024 0.041 0.018 
Sample size N = 746 N = 2,753 N = 746 N = 2,753 
 
 
  
Table XII: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Easy Escalation 
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable 
is either a dummy for increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and 
September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The 
sample is Easy Escalation recipients who were given peer information and have a 0% 
contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). 
The peer information value was the fraction of savings plan participants in the recipient’s five-
year or ten-year age bracket with before-tax contribution rates of at least 6%. The linear spline in 
age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14, 
2008 are controlled for using a full set of contribution rate dummies. All regressions include a 
constant. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Increased before-tax contribution rate
Dependent variable: 
Before-tax contribution rate change 
 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
Peer info value 2.309 0.494 11.108 7.414* 
 (1.901) (0.813) (7.085) (4.179) 
Male dummy -0.035 -0.002 -0.050 0.014 
 (0.031) (0.014) (0.124) (0.062) 
log(Tenure) 0.000 -0.002 -0.063 0.019 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.069) (0.032) 
log(Salary) 0.069 0.056*** 0.371* 0.487*** 
 (0.055) (0.017) (0.215) (0.166) 
Age spline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contribution rate 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.041 0.020 0.064 0.021 
Sample size N = 511 N = 1,822 N = 511 N = 1,822 
 
 
  
Table XIII: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment Among Employees 
with a 0% Contribution Default: Interaction with Relative Salary Within Firm and State 
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable 
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample in the 
left two columns is Quick Enrollment recipients who have a 0% contribution rate default. In the 
right two columns, this sample is further restricted to employees who received peer information. 
“Salary below median in firm and state” is a dummy for having a salary below the median salary 
among all active employees at the firm in the same state, including those not in the experiment. 
“Peer info value” is the plan participation rate of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year or ten-
year age bracket. The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 
67.5. In the right two columns, all components of the age spline are also interacted with the 
salary below median dummy. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Enrolled  
in plan 
Contribution 
rate change 
Enrolled  
in plan 
Contribution 
rate change 
Received peer info 0.007 0.042   
dummy (0.018) (0.105)   
Salary below -0.052* -0.291*   
median in firm and 
state × peer info 
(0.028) (0.167)   
Peer info value   0.984 5.988 
   (0.847) (5.112) 
Salary below   -2.844** -17.254** 
median in firm and 
state × peer value 
  (1.126) (7.025) 
Salary below 0.079*** 0.457*** 3.923** 20.611** 
median in firm and 
state 
(0.022) (0.132) (1.642) (9.140) 
Male dummy -0.011 -0.035 0.014 0.108 
 (0.020) (0.118) (0.023) (0.139) 
log(Tenure) -0.024*** -0.142*** -0.009 -0.055 
 (0.008) (0.047) (0.009) (0.054) 
log(Salary) 0.021 0.100 -0.017 -0.108 
 (0.023) (0.137) (0.029) (0.178) 
Age spline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Salary below med. 
× age spline 
No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.035 0.031 0.041 0.040 
Sample size N = 1,024 N = 1,024 N = 687 N = 687 
 
  
Table XIV: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment Among Employees 
with a 0% Contribution Default: Interaction with Salary Relative to Firm-Wide Median 
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable 
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample in the 
left two columns is Quick Enrollment recipients who have a 0% contribution rate default. In the 
right two columns, this sample is further restricted to employees who received peer information. 
“Salary below firm median” is a dummy for having a salary below the median salary among all 
active employees in the firm, including those not in the experiment. “Peer info value” is the plan 
participation rate of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year or ten-year age bracket. The linear 
spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. In the right two columns, 
all components of the age spline are also interacted with the salary below firm median dummy. 
All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Enrolled  
in plan 
Contribution 
rate change 
Enrolled  
in plan 
Contribution 
rate change 
Received peer info -0.025 -0.149   
dummy (0.032) (0.192)   
Salary below firm -0.019 -0.089   
median × peer info (0.039) (0.230)   
Peer info value   -2.189 -13.142 
   (1.989) (11.911) 
Salary below firm   0.458 2.647 
median × peer value   (2.129) (12.823) 
Salary below firm 0.051 0.281 0.654 0.776 
median (0.039) (0.232) (1.914) (10.943) 
Male dummy -0.013 -0.045 0.013 0.100 
 (0.020) (0.117) (0.022) (0.137) 
log(Tenure) -0.024*** -0.144*** -0.009 -0.054 
 (0.008) (0.047) (0.009) (0.054) 
log(Salary) 0.028 0.141 -0.010 -0.069 
 (0.025) (0.153) (0.033) (0.206) 
Age spline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Salary below firm 
med. × age spline 
No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.034 0.030 0.043 0.042 
Sample size N = 1,024 N = 1,024 N = 687 N = 687 
 
 
 
  
Table XV: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Easy Escalation: 
Interaction with Before-Tax Contribution Rate Prior to the Experiment 
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable 
is either a dummy for increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and 
September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The 
sample is Easy Escalation recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 
6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14, 2008 
are controlled for using a full set of contribution rate dummies. The regressions also include the 
interaction between the dummy for receiving peer information and a dummy for having a before-
tax contribution rate of 0%, 1%, or 2% (as opposed to 3%, 4%, or 5%). The linear spline in age 
has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. All regressions include a constant. Standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Increased before-tax contribution rate 
Dependent variable: 
Before-tax contribution rate change 
 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default 
Received peer 0.038 -0.019 0.175* -0.041 
info dummy (0.034) (0.021) (0.090) (0.063) 
Cont. rate 0% to -0.087* 0.032 -0.378* 0.184* 
2% × peer info (0.049) (0.024) (0.200) (0.107) 
Male dummy -0.052** 0.002 -0.147 0.024 
 (0.026) (0.011) (0.105) (0.047) 
log(Tenure) -0.003 0.001 -0.048 0.029 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.057) (0.023) 
log(Salary) 0.059 0.056*** 0.286* 0.406*** 
 (0.038) (0.014) (0.147) (0.115) 
Age spline Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Contribution rate 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.033 0.025 0.045 0.018 
Sample size N = 746 N = 2,753 N = 746 N = 2,753 
 
